Icbm Escalation Repacketo

Let us simulate a scenario using the ICBM Escalation Repacketo in the Taiwan Strait.

Step 1: China launches a conventionally-armed ICBM from an inland silo toward a US Navy carrier group 500 miles off the coast. Step 2: US satellites detect the launch. The US President is woken up. The NORAD computer says "High confidence: ICBM trajectory. Unknown warhead type." Step 3: The US must decide: Is this the Repacketo (conventional) or a decapitation strike (nuclear)? Step 4: If the US assumes it is conventional and does nothing, they risk a nuclear hit. If they assume it is nuclear and launch a retaliatory ICBM, they guarantee nuclear war. icbm escalation repacketo

This is the "Repacketo Trap." By repackaging the ICBM as ambiguous, the aggressor forces the defender to choose between suicide and surrender. Statistically, rational actors choose suicide (retaliation) less than 50% of the time. The Repacketo exploits this irrational vulnerability. Let us simulate a scenario using the ICBM

Washington is divided. The Missile Defense Agency loves the Repacketo because it justifies massive spending on discrimination sensors (to tell conventional ICBMs from nuclear ones). The State Department hates it, arguing that any US adoption of the Repacketo will legitimize Russian and Chinese use. The US President is woken up

To operationalize the ICBM Escalation Repacketo, a nation must adopt three radical changes to its military posture.

The "Repacketto" system upgrades our arsenal with the following features: